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AN IMMODERATE SKEPTICISM 
SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR UNGER'S PAPER 
by 
Max Black 
Unlike Hume or Descartes, Professor Unger is apparently undisturbed by 
skeptical doubts about the existence of the external world or other minds. 
Knowledge alone is the target of his skepticism. He regards knowledge as a 
chimera and offers "a positive argument" to prove that "nobody ever knows 
anything to be so." This is indeed "an extremely strong and sweeping con­
clusion," implying, among other things, that Unger does not know what he is 
saying, does not know whether he has the slightest reason for holding his con­
clusion, and for all he or anyone else knows may be talking gibberish. (He ad­
mitted as much in discussion.) But such an ad hominem retort, relevant though 
it is, is too facile to be satisfying. So let us look at the argument. 
Unger's formtilation runs as follows: 
(1) If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for that 
person to be absolutely certain that it is so. 
(2) It is never all right for anybody to be absolutely certain that something 
is so. 
Hence: 
(3) Nobody ever knows anything to be so. 
Unger subsequently introduces some modifications of the two premises. 
Thus, he ·suggests rewording (1) as follows: 
(lq) If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for that person 
to be absolutely certain that it is so-providing only that no overriding con­
siderations make it not all right. 
Unger's reasons for the qualification I have italicised in (lq) is that sometimes 
it is a "bad thing" to know something to be the case�.g., to know embarrassing 
details about somebody's private life-and hence a bad thing to be certain 
about such matters. But Unger is in no position to attach such a qualification. 
For he holds tha·t, in virtue of the ordinary uses of the key words, to know 
anything "entails" being "absolutely certain" of it. Hence , his proposed amend­
ment of (1) is incoherent. If knowledge entails absolute certainty, there can be 
no question about it's being "all right" for a knower to be absolutely certain 
of the thing he knows-he can't help himself! It is as absurd for Unger, from 
his standpoint, to say that it is sometimes all right for a knower to be abso-
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lutely certain as it would be to say that it is sometimes all right for a bachelor to 
be unmarried. Unger can at best cont�nd that while "absolute certainty" and 
the knowledge entailing it are always "wrong," we might condone such wrongs 
as lesser evils. (AF. one might think it always wrong to kill, while allowing that 
killing might be preferable to something even worse.) 
Something similar may be said about the parallel modifications that Unger 
introduces into his second premise. Here, too, the c;aveat that, in certain 
exceptional cases. it may be "all right" to be absolutely certain, e.g., because 
of the incidental and ac�idental good that might result, is beside the point. He 
thinks that "absolute certainty" per se, and the knowledge which supposedly 
entails it, are bad things-and that is what is really in question. The original, 
unqualified form of tbe argument, is faithful to Unger's intentions. 
The argument from (1) and (2) to (3) is formally valid. (Yet it would be, at 
best, an odd argument from "should not" to "is not"-from the supposedly bad 
consequences of knowl,edge to its non.existence.) 
Let us then consider what Unger means by "absolute certainty." For him 
it is virtually synonymous with "dogmatic," a move that makes his thesis more 
persuasive than it would otherwise be. But there is no jU!stification for using 
"dogmatism" as a direct negative of "skepticism," when the latter is defined, 
for Ung1er's purpose, as the proposition that Nothing can ever be known by 
anybody. The negation of that proposition would be� At least one thing is 
known by somebody. (And that thesis might have "cognitivism" rather than 
the passion-engendering epithet of "dogmatism" attached to it.) 
But iUnger repeatedly uses "dogmatism " in another sense, in which he 
equates it with the "rejection" of evidence. He says that the "dogmatic " atti· 
tude is that of holding that no "new information, evidence or experience 
which one might have will be seriously considered by one to be at all relevant to 
any possible change in one's thinking in the matter." For Unger, to be dogmatic, 
or absolutely certain of anything, is to have closed .one's .mind utterly, to "give 
no weight in one's thinkjng" to further evidence, to consider no "new experience 
or information as seriously relevant to the truth or falsity" of the thing known. 
In short. to be beyond the reach of relevant criticism. 
No doubt, "dogmatism" of this sort is a "bad thing." (But in what sense? 
Is it morally r�prehensiblc to be ove'r-confident, even arrogant, in one's know· 
ledge-claims?) If knowledge entailed contumacious tenacity of belief, it ought 
to be sh1Unned as evil. (But an imaginary evil, according to Unger, since ca.:ses of 
knowledge never occur.) But does knowledge have such dire implications'? I 
think not. 
Suppose I am charged with an offense that I know myself to be incapable of 
committing-say that of having profited by passing off Unger's essay as my own 
for the purpose of publication. Does my knowledge make it logically impossible 
for me to "consider seriously" the evidence introduced by the prosecution'? Of 
course not. My knowledge of my own innocence of this implausible crime 
leaves me still able to see that certain pieces of evidence are relevant and 
therefore need rebuttal. Of course, there is a sense of "seriously consider" in 
which I could never attach any credence to the suggestion that I might be 
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mistaken in this matter. (Could I have used his paper inadvertently? Anybody 
who could believe that, as the Duke of Wellington once said in another con­
nection, could believe anything.) 
Most cases of knowledge are less dramatic than the one I have imagined. 
My justified claim to know that, say, copper is metal, cannot exempt me from 
the damaging impact of possible contrary evidence. However confident I may 
be that further relevant data would only vindicate my knowledge-claim, and 
however justified I now am in making that claim, I might prove to be wrong 
after all. And in saying so, while reaffirming what I know, I am not, pace 
Unger, contradicting myself. 
The most plausible variant of Unger's proposition (1) mighl read as follows: 
(la) If .somebody knows something to be the case, then he is justified in 
feeling confident (or, perhaps, even: being convinced) that it is the case. 
And is that a "bad thing?" I see nothing wrong with it. One may be confident 
that something is the case while conceding on the basis of one's demonstrated 
fallability that one might after all be mistaken. Confident assertion is com­
patible with the absence of any "dogmatism " that might warrant censure. 
I conclude that Unger's argument has little to recommend it, except as 
supplying one more example of how easily philosophers can be led into ad­
vocating preposterous conclusions, by misusing ordinary language while all the 
time claiming to have used the key words "in the ordinary senses of those 
words." 
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